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THE RAILROAD PENSION ACT AND PROMOTION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
D. J. FARAGE*
The unusual interest evoked by the now famous Schechter case' has served
to relegate to a less conspicuous position other recent constitutional decisions
of our Supreme Court holding invalid social legislation of the New Deal era.
Among these less thought about cases, that of Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Ry. Co., 2 hereinafter called the Railroad Pension Case, offers special interest to
students of constitutional law. Certainly, its implications insofar as they limit the
scope of the commerce power of Congress are highly important.
Briefly, the Railroad Pension Case concerned itself with the constitutional
validity of a federal statute which required railroads to provide pensions for such
employees, upon retirement, as had been engaged in interstate commerce. The
Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that the act was invalid.3
The first ground relied upon by Justice Roberts, speaking for the majority,
against the validity of the Act, was that a number of particular features of the
act were arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore in contravention of the "due
process" clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is not within the purview of this
paper to consider the propriety of thus invoking the Fifth Amendment, apart
from observing that in the light of four dissents, the question was perhaps an
open one.4
The second ground stressed against the Act was that Congress had absolutely
no power under the commerce clause5 to pass any pension act, even though the
statute were admittedly free of arbitrary features. This argument of course, far
transcends that of "due process" in importance.6 As Chief Justice Hughes re7
marked in his dissenting opinion,
*A. B., 1930; LL. B., 1933, University of Pennsylvania; admitted to practice in Pennsylvania,
1933; Assistant to Francis H. Bohlen, Reporter on Torts, Restatement, for American Law Institute,
1933-; Professor, Dickinson School of Law, 1934-.
155-S. Ct. 837 (1935).
255 S.Ct. 758 (1935).
8The dissenting Justices were Hughes, Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo.
4
The minority disputed some, though not all, charges of unreasonable features in the act.
SArt. I, Section 8, Subsec. 3.
BAs this paper goes to press, itappears that a recent article has ably demonstrated that the court
utnnecessarily relied on the "'lack of commerce power" argument. Powell, "Commerce, Pensions, and
Codes," 49 H. L. R. I (Nov. 1935).
755 S. Ct. 758, at page 773.
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"The gravest aspect of the decision is that it does not rest simply
upon a condemnation of particular features of the Railroad Retirement
Act-but denies to Congress the power to pass any compulsory pension act for railroad employees. If the opinion were limited to the
particular provisions of the act which the majority find to be objectionable and not severable, the Congress would be free to overcome the objections by a new statute."
The statute of course, by its terms, was applicable only in favor of employees
in interstate commerce. There was no claim that the statute attempted to regulate
intrastate activity. The basis for Justice Roberts' view that the commerce power
did not support the Act was merely that, in his opinion, the Act fails to "promote"
interstate commerce. The proponents of the statute argued that it would promote
safety and efficiency in the railway industry. But the majority of the Court was
adamant in its view, in spite of an expression in the Act itself that one of its purposes was the "promotion of efficiency and safety in interstate transportation",
that there could, in fact, be no promotion of the industry through the operation
of the statute.
The minority bitterly assailed the majority's position. After pointing out that
"where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the existence of
facts, courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them contrary
to that reached by the Legislature", 8 Chief Justice Hughes argued that interstate
commerce would be promoted by the statute because,
"it is clear that the morale of railroad employees has an important
bearing upon the efficiency of the transportation service, and that a
reasonable pension plan by its assurance of security is an appropriate
means to that end." 9
Very similar, of course, to the problem presented in the Railroad Pension Case,
was that involved in the Second Employers' Liability Act Cases.10 There the
Supreme Court held valid a federal statute which provided for workmen's compensation for railroad employees engaged in interstate commerce. It seems difficult on principle to argue that a federal workmen's compensation act does promote interstate commerce but that a federal -pension act for the same employees
does not. After all, in both cases, payments may be made to individuals who because of serious illness or old age, may never again actually engage in railroad
work.
8d., at page 775.
91d., at page 775.
10223 U. S. 1 (1912).
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Justice Robert spins a very fine theory to distinguish the two cases. He said: 11
"Workmen's Compensation laws deal with existing rights and liabilities by readjusting old benefits and burdens incident to the relation of employer and employee. Before their adoption, the employer was bound to provide a fund to answer the lawful claims of his
employees;
* * * The act with which we are concerned seeks to
attach to the relation of employer and employee a new incident, without reference to any existing obligation or legal liability, solely in
the interest of the employee, with no regard to the conduct of the
business, or its safety or efficiency, but purely for social ends."
In other words, the distinction drawn by Justice Robert seems to be that the effect
of Compensation Acts is, to borrow another of his phrases, merely "to substitute
a new remedy for the common-law right of action",' 2 whereas the Pension Act
gives the employees a gratuity.
That such a distinction in fact exists between Workmen's Compensation Acts
and the Pension Act is highly doubtful. The majority overlooks, that to the extent
that Compensation Acts now allow recovery to employees in spite of the defenses
of "contributory negligence" or "voluntary assumption of risk" or in spite of the
"fellow-servant" rule, to that extent the employee is being given something for
nothing by the Workmen's Compensation Acts since at common law these defenses would have been an absolute bar to recovery.
Moreover, assuming that the distinction which the majority draws does in
fact exist, why should that fact necessarily be legally operative to produce a
different result. Rare indeed are enactments which merely substitute one remedy
for another, leaving a status quo in the substantive relations of the parties involved. Most statutes take something substantial from those amenable thereto,
or they give something to beneficiaries without necessarily extracting a quid pro
quo.
It is to be noted that the distinction made by Justice Roberts in effect causes
him to abandon the alleged requirement that regulation under the commerce power
to be valid must "promote" interstate commerce, in favor of another and different
requirement that the legislation shall not operate to take something from one
person without compensation, nor to give something to another as a gratuity.
In effect, Justice Robert says, "I admit that the Pension Act promotes interstate
commerce to the same extent as Workmen's Compensation Acts, but what I object to is that the railroads here are being made to give up something for nothing."
This requirement of quid pro quo obviously would tend to "sand-bag" effective exercise of the commerce power. No other case appears to have suggested
115 S. Ct. 758 at page 772.
121d., at page 772.
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that such a condition precedent is necessary to the exercise of the commerce power.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether Justice Roberts meant to set a precedent in this
particular. What probably happened was that in his astuteness to distinguish
Workmen's Compensation Acts from the Pension Act, he lost sight of the fundamental test by which he had undertaken to determine the validity of statutes under
the commerce power. So far as the similarity of the Pension Act to ,Workmen's
Compensation Acts is concerned, as Chief Justice Hughes remarked in his dissent,
"The effort to dispose of the analogy serves only to make it the more impressive."1"
The most highly significant feature about the Railroad Pension Case remains
to be pointed out. It will be noted that while the Court definitely split on the
question as to whether the statute in question "promoted" interstate commerce,
on the other hand, the entire court seemed to concur in treating that question as
being the crux of the case. The fact is that the entire court really assumed without questioning or investigation that the promotion of interstate commerce has
to be a necessary consequence of regulation of interstate commerce in order that
the power be validly exercised. In other words, the whole court seems to accept
the theory that "regulation" means "promotion".
This theory has given rise to two corollaries, (1) that power to regulate
does not constitute power to prohibit; (2) that power to regulate cannot be used
to accomplish an objective outside of benefitting commerce itself; that is, that for
example, the power to regulate commerce cannot be used as police power.14 The
soundness of these corollaries especially in the light of past decisions of the Court
is dubious.
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Congress cannot order embargoes on

foreign commerce because, rather than promoting it, the embargo operates to shut
off entirely foreign commerce. Yet would anyone contend that Congress cannot
call off trade because of any theory that the power to regulate does not include
power to prohibit? Obviously, prohibition may, on occasion, be one of the best
methods of regulating. Nor can it be soundly argued that a distinction should
be drawn between regulation of foreign commerce and regulation of interstate
commerce; for, power to regulate both is given in the same breath by the same
clause of the Constitution. 15 Similarly, the Constitution provides for the "regulation" by Congress of land and naval forces. 16 Does that mean that Congress can
only build up the forces but never diminish them?
The argument that power to regulate does not include power to prohibit
was raised squarely in the Lottery Case,'7 where the Supreme Court held that
'3Id., at page 777.
14 See supra, note 11, the quotation from the opinion of Justice Roberts in which he voices this
second corollary.
I sArt. I, Sec. 8, Subsec. 3.
I6Art. I, Sec. 8, Subsec. 14.
1YChampion vs. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
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Congress had power under the commerce clause to prohibit lotteries from passing
in interstate commerce. The court vigorously denied that the power to regulate
is not power to prohibit.
The second corollary of the theory that regulation means promotion, namely
that the commerce power cannot be used to reach other objectives beyond the
betterment of commerce itself, has enjoyed a livelier career. One of the earliest
payments of lip-service to it occured in connection with the Second Employers' Liability Act Cases,' 8 where the Court held that a statute providing for Workmen's
Compensation for railroad employees engaged in interstate commerce was valid.
The Court in answering the contention that the statute there involved did not promote commerce, worked out the argument that the statute did promote commerce
by making the railway industry safer.
The course pursued by the Court was not at all necessary to reach the result the
Court had in mind. Reliance could have been placed on prior analogous decisions.
In the case of In re Rapier,19 Congress under the postal power, passed an act forbidding the sending of lotteries through the mail. It was argued that the statute
there did not improve or deal with the mail service as such, but that it was in the
nature of a police regulation. The Court rejected the argument saying in effect
that power is power no matter for what purpose it might be used.
In Veazie Bank vs. Fenno,2 0 a federal tax was imposed on state banks not for
the purpose of bringing in revenue but to drive the state banks into becoming national banks and thereby invest in federal securites being floated to finance the
Civil War. The tax was held valid. So too, in the License Tax Cases," a tax on lotteries was upheld though its purpose was not to get revenue but to curb lotteries.
Again in McCray vs. U. S.,22 an oppressive tax on oleomargarine which operated
to drive it out of the market in favor of butter, was held valid although its purpose
was not to get revenue but to act like police power in hitting the sale of oleomargarine.
The Court in the Second Employers' Liability Act Cases could have followed
these analogies and said that so long as Congress used the commerce power to affect interstate activities, it was immaterial for what purpose the power was used.
Instead, the Court nourished along the theory that the commerce power can be
used only to improve commerce, by attempting to show that the particular statute
did benefit commerce.
Granting some remote benefit upon commerce through such a statute, it
seems dear, however, that the statute when passed was intended purely and solely
lSSupra note 10.
19143 U. S.110 (1891).
208 Wafl. 533 (1869).
2
15 Wal. 462 (1867).
22195 U. S. 27 (1914).
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as social legislation. 23 If a benefit was thereby conferred upon interstate commerce
as such, that fact was discovered and invoked by the Court after the event to justify
the validity of the act; it was not a benefit upon commerce as such that was contemplated by the statute. The Court should have frankly accepted the statute for what
it was meant to be,- as purely social legislation. And the answer of the Court to
the contention that the commerce power was being used for purpose other than
to benefit commerce, should have been a mere, "What of it?"
In B. and 0. Ry. vs. Int. Com. Comm., 24 the Supreme Court upheld a statute
limiting the hours of labor of employees of interstate carriers. Again, some remote
benefit to interstate commerce may be found as a result. But again, was not that
Act essentially a piece of social legislation? So long as it affects only interstate
activities, what matter that it is in the nature of a police regulation?
In Champion vs. Ames, 25 which was also decided before the-Second Employers' Liability Act Cases, the Supreme Court held it constitutional to prohibit interstate traffic of lotteries, the statute there being based on the commerce power. The
Court, paying lip-service to the theory that regulation means promdtion, found as
a convenient formula of words for avoiding the theory, that the lotteries "polluted
the stream" of interstate commerce, and that the prohibition therefore promoted
commerce by removing the pollution. This concept of commerce as a stream of
water is obviously metaphysical. Viewed from a realistic standpoint, the Court
really decided that the commerce power can be used to accomplish a social objective
other than the improvement of commerce itself, for from a practical viewpoint,
it is difficult to see how lotteries in interstate commerce would necessarily hurt
other legitimate interstate business.
Again in Hoke vs. U. S., 2 6 the Supreme Court heid valid a federal statute
which made it a crime to transport any girl across state lines for the purpose of
prostitution. Does such a statute improve commerce as such? Could such a statute
nave been intended by Congress as other than social legislation, having the effect
of police regulation? Yet since the statute dealt only with interstate transportation, it was held valid.
A similar decision was reached in Brooks vs. U. S. 27 There the Court upheld
as valid a federal act which punished the taking of stolen automobiles across state
lines. Again, apart from the metaphysical concept of "pollution of the stream"
23Many writers deny that Workmen's Compensation Acts tend to promote safety on the theory
that the employer becomes more careful of his employees' welfare. The fact is that employers generally provide for Workmen's Compensation by taking out insurance. Having paid the insurance
premium, it is immaterial to the employer whether his employees suffer one or a thousand injuries.
Professor Bohlen, an outstanding authority on Workmen's Compensation Law, rejects the notion that
the Acts promote safety.
24221 U. S. 612 (1911).
2fSupra note 17.
k6227 U. S. 308 (1913).
21267 U. S. 432 (1925).
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of commerce, the statute does not seem to promote commerce as such. This act
too, was only social legislation.
The RailroadPension Case, in the light of these cases, goes far in giving bone
and substance to what was heretofore only an empty formula. Heretofore, social
legislation has been upheld under the commerce power and the Courts have recognized the theory that regulation means promotion, only by resorting to ingenious
explanations to show benefits conferred on commerce and by using metaphysical
formulae (like "pollution of the stream of commerce") to explain away a theory
which was almost as metaphysical as its explanations. Now, in the Pension Case,
the Court definitely looks for a direct beneficial influence on commerce. It seems
indeed strange that not even one dissenting member of the Court assailed the taking for granted of the premise that "regulation" necessitates "promotion".
This narrow view of the meaning of the term regulation definitely limits
the sphere of beneficial governmental activity. It means that even though states
are powerless to deal with social evils because they are attached to interstate business and therefore outside the powers reserved by the Constitution to the States,
nevertheless Congress, too, is to lack power to deal with these social evils because
to regulate them is not to improve commerce itself. Thus there arises a "vacuum
of anarchy" 28 within which the unscrupulous may act with impunity.
It is improbable that the Pension Case will bring doubt upon the validity of
statutes already adjudicated constitutional. However, it will encourage doubtful
and debatable argument as to whether and how any future statute has a direct
tendency to promote commerce. Must the promotion be substantial? If so, how
substantial must it be? Are the views of Congress as to whether an act promotes
commerce to be given any effect, or shall the Court constitute itself a super-legislature and determine for itself in each case whether Congress has conformed to
the Court's standard of what is substantial? It is to be hoped that the Court will
view its past decisions realistically so as to recognize that it has upheld purely
social legislation as valid under the-commerce power, and that it will in the future
adopt the broader and saner view of the meaning of the term regulation.
Carlisle, Pa.
28

D. J. Farage

John Dickinson, Defect of Power in Constitutional Law, 9 Temple Law Quarterly 389 (1935).

